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stance of this we note the assertion, and the argument built upon it, that on the abolition of feudalism the *daimyos* were allowed one-half of their assessed incomes, whereas all other Japanese and European authorities to our knowledge fix the amount as one-tenth. And another case in point is the positive statement regarding Komura's instructions at Portsmouth. Many readers, also, will regret the presence of unconfirmable gossip in the pages of an otherwise scholarly book. The columns of a partisan newspaper in the heat of a political campaign hardly serve as a reliable source of information.

One point which Professor McLaren repeatedly makes is that the expansion of Japan into the mainland was the result of the "inherent chauvinism" of the people and was constantly in mind from before the Meiji days. Of this statement he gives no convincing proof, although, on the other hand, he does describe how, in 1873, the government adopted that policy of peaceful internal development which prevailed until 1894. That there is some error in judgment here is the more probable when we note a confusion of the Japanese-Korean treaties of 1876 and of 1885, and the quite misleading statement of the causes of the Chino-Japanese War. And just as in the case of Japanese foreign relations the author holds fast to certain fixed ideas, so in the discussion of political developments the high standard of British political institutions is applied too rigidly to Japan, with but little allowance for the political experience of the people. For this reason Professor McLaren's interpretation of Japanese political history is not as well-balanced as his knowledge of the documents would lead us to expect. And if his picture is a gloomy one it is mainly because he has omitted many of the touches which might have brightened his canvas. The work of the bureaucrats has not been entirely bad. There is evidence that political conditions in Japan are improving: education and experience are producing better informed voters, the members of the later Diets are certainly superior in training and ability to their predecessors, and the long struggle between the Lower House and the bureaucrats, especially the army and the navy leaders, would cause one to accept with some reservation the statement that "since 1894 the power of the military clique has steadily increased and that of the political parties declined".

PAYSON J. TREAT.

Les Auteurs de la Guerre de 1914. Par ERNEST DAUDET. Volume I. *Bismarck.* Deuxième Edition. Volume II. *Guillaume II. et François-Joseph.* (Paris and Neuchâtel: Attinger Frères. 1916. Pp. 287; 275.)

THE author of the *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Alliance Franco-Russe* has here endeavored to demonstrate a particular thesis. "The old pretensions of Prussia against our country constitute one of the principal causes of the war" (I. 15). They date from before the Revolution,

they explain Prussian policy from 1792 to the Congress of Vienna, when Alsace and Lorraine were vainly demanded, and the real motive of Bismarck's wars with Denmark and Austria was his passionate desire to square Prussia's account with France (I. 26). M. Daudet further believes that Bismarck's "policy of force, deceit, and treachery" became endemic in German diplomacy, and that he "is responsible for all that has happened since his day along the paths on which he started his country" (I. 6, 11). Unfortunately it cannot be said that this contention is satisfactorily worked out.

About half the first volume is devoted to the crisis of 1875 and the Schnaebele incident of 1887. Numerous quotations from unpublished reports of the French ambassadors in Berlin reinforce the usual verdict that while Bismarck utilized the scares to strengthen his political position at home, he hoped to secure from France a definitive recognition of the treaty of Frankfort and was not averse to war if the situation developed favorably. For the rest, there is a detailed account of the relations of Bismarck and William II. Hohenlohe, Busch, the reports of Herbette (then French ambassador in Berlin), and contemporary gossip are quoted with great effect to show the abominable conduct of both men to the dying Frederick III. and his wife. Then we are reminded of the dismay and disgust aroused in Germany by the first actions of William II., and this leads to the rupture with Bismarck, a story which M. Daudet tells with relish. The only new fact revealed is that Bismarck urged the French government not to participate in the labor conference which was the young emperor's panacea for socialistic agitation. The purpose of this narrative is not specifically stated: the thought is, apparently, that William II., once an ardent admirer and intimate of Bismarck, was contaminated by the association and thereby inoculated with the virus of Bismarckian statecraft. Certainly the emperor got rid of his mentor in true Bismarckian fashion—and the episode is symptomatic of many later actions. In the final chapters, describing Bismarck's activities after 1890, the emperor is portrayed anxious to forgive and forget; with as much success as attended Bismarck's or his own efforts to reconcile France with the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.

M. Daudet has not written a biography of Bismarck, and says so. He has selected certain episodes of that marvellous career which sustain his argument, and ignored everything else. Undoubtedly the mainspring of Bismarck's policy after 1870 was to isolate France and to represent her as the firebrand of Europe; nevertheless it is worth remarking that in the opinion of many, including Dr. Holland Rose, his policy was one of peace, and the Triple Alliance, to which M. Daudet barely refers, a conservative factor. But perhaps it is too much to expect a French clerical to find anything good in the statesman who approved of the Third Republic and precipitated the *Kulturkampf*.

Volume II. is journalistic and belies its title. There are superficial

sketches of Francis Joseph and William II. (the latter in the seventh chapter, although it should come first), and a chapter on "Germany Prepares for War" consisting chiefly of quotations from the French Yellow and Belgian Grey Books. That is all about the "authors of the war". M. Daudet has something to say about the diplomatic circle of Vienna in July, 1914, describes the last journey of Francis Ferdinand, fulminates against the dishonesty of the Ballplatz in the month following the assassination: a rehash of the daily press and the diplomatic correspondence. He concludes with a brief analysis, based largely on the French Yellow Book, of the ultimatum to Serbia and the ensuing negotiations.

M. Daudet writes with characteristic French charm, his narrative bristles with interesting conversations and intimate touches, and his patriotism makes him a good hater. But he adds little to our knowledge and ventures no new interpretations. It is to be hoped that the third volume, *Les Complices*, will be more stimulating.

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT.

Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congrès de Berlin jusqu'à nos Jours. Par A. DEBIDOUR, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris. Seconde Partie. *Vers la Grande Guerre (1904-1916).* (Paris: Félix Alcan. 1917. Pp. 379.)

THE second volume of M. Debidour's survey of European diplomacy during the past generation bears out the promise of its predecessor. It is concise, comprehensive, and well proportioned. Taking up the narrative with the Russo-Japanese War, the author carries it on in nine chapters to the summer of 1916. The two opening chapters are devoted to the struggle in Manchuria with its diplomatic effects, and to the first Moroccan crisis. The Hague Convention of 1907 forms the subject of the third. Then follows a description of the diplomatic conflict between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente in 1908 and 1911, characterized by the Casablanca and Bosnian crises in the former year and the Agadir crisis in the latter. Near-Eastern affairs are studied in the two succeeding chapters, which include the Tripolitan War, the formation of the Balkan League, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, and the European situation immediately previous to the great explosion. Chapter VIII. analyzes the crisis of 1914, and the final chapter sketches the events which led to the entrance of Turkey, Italy, and Bulgaria, into the struggle. His narrative finished, the author permits himself, in a brief three pages, to characterize frankly German policy, which by its disregard of the law of nations has made inevitable the infinite calamity of the general war. The volume is concluded with *pièces justificatives* which extend over fifty pages and include such documents as the General Act of the Algeciras Conference, the Final Act of the Hague Convention, Franco-British conventions, and correspondence between Kiderlen-Waechter and Jules Cambon.